Does it pay to be transparent? international evidence form central bank forecasts - commentary by Adam S. Posen




n the span of 15 years, central bank transparency
has gone from being highly controversial to
motherhood and apple pie (or knighthood and
fish and chips to the Bank of England–based authors
of this paper). It is now an accepted broad goal to
which all central banks pay at least lip service. Yet,
like many other broad concepts in macroeconomic
policy, such as “fiscal discipline” or “price stability,”
what central bank transparency actually means
remains rather open to debate. Chortareas,
Stasavage, and Sterne make a valiant attempt to
test whether one particular aspect of transparency—
the release of economic forecasts by central banks
to the public—confers the benefits that some theo-
ries predict it should. 
Recent monetary theory has had difficulties in
generating much in the way of operational hypothe-
ses about transparency for empirical examination.
The bulk of today’s theoretical models applied to
central bank transparency—including those in the
formal analysis of inflation targeting—cast the issue
as whether or not a representative agent of the
public can discern the central bank’s “type” (wet
or dry; that is, soft or hard on inflation) and therefore
whether it is more or less “credible.”1 This is simply
the wrong question to frame, especially in the devel-
oped economies: no one really has any doubts about
the commitment of any current central banks to
low inflation, and any reasons for doubt in this area
would quickly become self-evident.2 Even in the
developing economies (which make up the bulk of
the authors’ sample), discerning runaway fiscal
positions, overt political pressures upon central
bank governors, or economic world views at odds
with today’s (perhaps questionable but evident)
consensus on a vertical long-run Phillips curve is
rather easy. Moreover, the all-or-nothing trigger
strategy in these models implies that, once a central
bank type is revealed, all is determined. This unreal-
istically reduces the conversation between central
banks and the private sector to a simple long-lasting
thumbs up or thumbs down. For purposes of even
applied research, the failure of the predictions of
these widely used models raises further questions3
about much of the theoretical time-inconsistency
framework that has been the workhorse of mone-
tary economics in the last 20 years.4
The authors, presumably in pursuit of rigor
and microfoundations, go to great pains to survey
the extant literature in order to claim a source for
their two testable hypotheses: that greater trans-
parency reduces average inflation and increases
output volatility. Yet, the fact that these hypotheses
can easily be generated by a host of differing models
and say nothing specific about which (measurable)
aspect of transparency is at issue only underscores
how irrelevant these microfoundations are. The two
real issues are, instead, as follows: (i) to come up
with hypotheses that are specific to transparency
as distinct from just one more set of circular state-
ments indicating that more credible central banks
have better inflation performance and (ii) to derive
reproducible measures of transparency that differ-
entiate among the various types of information that
may be disclosed by central banks. Unfortunately,
the authors stick with the broad hypotheses and
arbitrarily focus on a particular aspect of trans-
parency, idiosyncratically measured. This puts them
somewhat at odds with those few rigorous empirical
investigations of central bank transparency that
have already been done. Does it pay to be transpar-
ent? Yes, but not in the way the authors suggest.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The authors’ plan of attack is deceptively simple.
They go through the current theoretical literature
on central bank transparency (primarily the works
of Cukierman, Faust and Svensson, Geraats, and
Jensen). They acknowledge the relative lack of clear
consensus on operational predictions:
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1 The seminal article starting this approach is Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986). See Faust and Svensson (2000a) and Geraats (2001), among
others, for examples of these models.
2 Despite the constant invocation of the word “credibility,” it remains
unclear that this concept does any meaningful work, except as a circu-
lar validation of successful central banks’ success. See Posen (1998).
3 Broader problems with this framework, such as the observation that
removal of the inflation premium proved rather easy once central
banks chose to remove it, have been noted previously by Blinder (1998),
McCallum (1997), and others.
4 The founding papers being Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978),
and Barro and Gordon (1983), with the aforementioned Cukierman
and Meltzer (1986) setting up a new subfield in this area. In the spirit
of transparency, I should acknowledge my own reliance on such models
in, for example, Kuttner and Posen (1999), despite earlier published
misgivings.The currently expanding theoretical litera-
ture on central bank transparency identifies
various channels through which increased
transparency may affect economic policy
outcomes. Not all of these move in the same
direction. And neither is there a universally
accepted definition of central bank trans-
parency. Various authors conceptualize
transparency in different ways…
They then abruptly decide in their investigations to
“focus on the detail in which central banks publish
forecasts…,” suggesting that this is of wide interest
without any particular justification for its saliency
over preferences, targets, models, decisionmaking
processes, or other aspects of central bank trans-
parency. Fair enough, were they to make this an
empirically driven exploration of simply what differ-
ence forecast disclosures make. 
But the authors then underline the arbitrariness
of their focus by spending several pages discussing
the inconsistent theoretical models, most of which
are concerned with the revelation of central bank
preferences (over inflation versus output goals and
for the target level of inflation). At the conclusion
of the paper’s first section, the authors assert that
“transparency is generally conceptualized as the
publication of central bank forecasts, since this
allows the public to observe the control error.” This
claim is incorrect in two senses. First, in terms of
the theory, the public is only able to discern the con-
trol error, given the forecast, if they are also informed
of the model of the economy, of the nature of any
revealed shocks (and/or the central bank’s percep-
tion of those shocks), and most importantly of the
central bank’s true preferences. The forecast sim-
ply is not enough to reveal what the authors claim
it does. Second, in terms of the empirical investiga-
tions, it is extremely difficult to say what specifically
should be the impact of forecast releases on observ-
able macroeconomic outcomes without considering
what other information releases or institutional
frameworks the central bank in question exercises.
In any event, the authors then identify two gen-
eral hypotheses about the effects of transparency
for testing: (i) that increasing transparency reduces
the incentive to inflationary policies, never resulting
in higher inflation outcomes and (ii) that improve-
ment in inflation performance may be offset by a
reduction in the capacity of the central bank to
stabilize the economy. The authors then pull in “a
new data set on central banking institutions,” created
from a survey of central banks conducted (under
the leadership of one of the authors) by the Centre
for Central Banking Studies of the Bank of England.
The results on the subset of questions on “…the
quality, scope, and frequency of forecasts and the
extent to which forecast errors are monitored and
publicly discussed” are to be used as the measure
of the independent variable of transparency. It should
be kept clear that they are testing joint hypotheses—
their offered hypotheses plus the idea that forecast
releases are a sufficient measure of transparency
plus the idea that the results of their measure accu-
rately portray forecasts—and not just the hypotheses
about transparency per se. 
In fact, this is critical, since the availability of
this survey data determines the scope of the authors’
investigations. The authors proceed to conduct a
cross-sectional analysis of the effects of this measure
of forecast disclosure on the level of inflation and
of the volatility of output, in a sample of 87 countries
over the period 1995-99. The four aspects of fore-
cast disclosure are amalgamated into a four-point
Guttman scale, a new twist on the standard additive
indices for such measures. They find a significant
negative correlation between their measure of fore-
cast transparency and average inflation, even when
controlling for such institutional factors as fixed
exchange rate pegs, political instability, and central
bank independence. They find no such significant
correlation between the disclosure of forecasts and
average output volatility. Finally, the authors take on
a large number of what they consider robustness
checks to their results, but they rephrase those as
the question, since “the effort required for a central
bank to publish detailed forecasts may not appear
to be particularly arduous relative to the benefits of
securing lower inflation…Why, then, do many more
central banks not introduce forecasts?” They end up
raising a number of questions about the possibility
of reverse causality, to which I will return.
SOME FRIGHTENING FOOTNOTES ON
THE RESULTS
Leaving aside for the moment the questions of
whether the dependent and independent variables
are properly defined, consider the authors’ results
on their own terms. Is the significant negative corre-
lation between this measure of forecast disclosure
and the average level of inflation (and the absence
of any such correlation with output volatility) well
established? Given the authors’ commendable clarity
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are a number of details which unfortunately raise
some doubts. These have to do for the most part with
the construction of the forecast disclosure index
and with the nature of the sample determined by
the availability of this index.
A particular concern is the absence of discussion
of subsamples beyond Table 1, where the distribution
of responses across industrial, transitional, and
developing economies’ central banks is displayed.
As shown in Table 1, however, there is a strong corre-
lation between level of development and positive
response to the survey regarding forecast disclosure:
56 percent of industrial countries publish forecasts
with words and numbers versus less than 25 percent
of transitional and less than 33 percent of developing
countries; 25 percent of industrial countries publish
“words and numbers” risks to the forecast, while
only 9 percent of transitional and no developing
countries do. While the authors later include per
capita gross domestic product (GDP) as a control
variable, this is likely insufficient to account for
such differences. In fact, in their robustness checks,
as displayed in the authors’ Figure 2, the authors
note that “[t]he coefficient becomes progressively
more negative as we include high-inflation countries
in the sample, suggesting that the estimated anti-
inflationary effect of publishing a forecast in our
Table 3 regressions may be somewhat inflated by
the inclusion of high-inflation countries.” This is
more than somewhat inflated—as the authors move
from 50 observations to 63 (in their total sample of
94), the estimated coefficient drops below the lower
bound of significance on the point estimate at 50,
while at 50 it was not significantly different from
zero. Considering that industrial economies make
up only 28 observations of their full sample, this
hardly is convincing of subsample stability. This
problem is exacerbated when one considers that,
by dummying out the pegged exchange rate coun-
tries in their Table 3, they are disproportionately
taking out (European) developed countries from
their sample.
A second set of concerns has to do with embed-
ding these results in the other aspects of central
bank structure. In short, for us to believe in these
results about the effects of forecast disclosure, we
have to believe that other aspects of central bank
transparency, independence, exchange rate regimes,
and the like are appropriately held constant. While
the authors make some attempt to do so, notably
by including the fixed exchange rate yes/no classifi-
cation from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF)
lists in their Table 3 regressions, these are insufficient.
The authors’ controls for inflation or money [sic]
targets in Table 3 are based on central banks’ self-
reporting from the same central bank survey (see
their footnote 22). As there is great dispute over who
should call themselves “inflation targeters” (includ-
ing those who are “implicit targeters”) and similar
dispute over “monetary targeters” (with many who
assume this label having proven their tendency to
ignore their stated monetary targets while making
policy decisions), this measure should be replaced
with a standardized, independently observable
means of verifying targeter status. 
Moreover, given the narrowness of the authors’
“focus” on forecast disclosure, it is difficult in the
time period they consider (the late 1990s) to disen-
tangle high scores on this measure from the adoption
of inflation targeting writ large. The authors them-
selves state in footnotes 30 and 31 that there is some
coincidence of the two and that their reporting of
self-assessed measures of targeter status leads to
some strange results (e.g., that only three countries
have changed their regimes four or more times since
Bretton Woods, which points up a very awkward
definition of regime). In their controls for central
bank independence, they use a very noisy measure
made up of five elements even though the literature
has long since established that only one aspect of
central bank transparency has predictive power for
the industrial economies (restrictions on direct
central bank purchases of government debt) and a
different single aspect has power for developing
economies (turnover of central bank governors).5
There are also some plain strange results which
are disclosed in the authors’ discussion, but not taken
sufficiently seriously. In footnote 23, they point out
that, while they get their expected results for a nega-
tive correlation between forecast disclosure and
inflation level, they find no link between their mea-
sure and inflation volatility, despite the long-standing
correlation of inflation’s volatility and level. Given
that the relationship between inflation volatility
and level increases with the level of inflation, this
may be another indicator that their desired corre-
lation is being driven unduly by the low-inflation
countries. In footnote 27, the authors note that only
3 of their 87 countries get a top score on their four-
point Gutman index of forecast disclosure; but foot-
note 41 shows that all the major variation across
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5 Berger, de Haan, and Eijffinger (2001) and Eijffinger and de Haan (1996).countries is in the jump between scores 3 and 4—
in other words, it is only whether the risks to forecast
are discussed that matters, and this should have
been done as a simple dummy. But, definitionally,
this is the aspect of the authors’ forecast disclosure
that has most to do with preferences, least to do
with forecast narrowly defined, and probably least
dependable as gathered in a self-description. This
re-raises the questions about the authors’ defini-
tion of the independent variable as a measure of
transparency. 
Finally, the authors’ Table 8, meant as a robust-
ness check using lagged inflation and volatility to
test for reverse causation between low inflation
and forecast disclosure, shows that the greater the
past inflation and output deviations (from “desir-
able,” presumably high and low, respectively) and
the greater the past volatility of each, the less dis-
closure of forecasts.6 Given that this runs opposite
to the theoretical models (e.g., those of Faust and
Svensson) that the authors invoke to justify their
investigations suggesting that central banks with
less credibility will need to disclose more, this re-
raises questions about the authors’ definition of the
dependent variables of interest as average inflation
and average output volatility. It also suggests, as the
authors acknowledge, “that it is difficult to be certain
there is not some endogeneity between transparency
[as defined by their forecast disclosure measure]
and inflation…”
WHAT DEFINITION OF TRANSPARENCY
IS RELEVANT? 
Returning to the design of the authors’ investiga-
tion, we have to reconsider the explanatory variable.
As discussed in Posen (1999), we can use the control
theory view of monetary policy to come up with
the aspects of central bank behavior that can be
revealed by transparency. Essentially, the central
bank has preferences over macroeconomic out-
comes, an intermediate target linked to a model of
the economy, and a forecast of that economy based
on shocks revealed to date. If the issue is to deter-
mine the central bank’s preferences on the relative
weight of inflation versus output goals or for a
longer-term target for inflation, the public and mar-
kets need two of these three plus the outcome in
the economy in order to determine the remaining
one. A forecast alone, even combined with economic
results, does not necessarily reveal preferences, with-
out a clear revelation of the central bank’s model.
Yet, in the real world, central banks never have one
exact model that is relied upon consistently, espe-
cially when there are multiple monetary policy
decisionmakers (voters on a committee) and chang-
ing economic structures; and, in the real world, the
public and even markets are unable to discern such
models and reason backwards from them and from
forecasts and shocks to determine central bank
preferences, even if it is possible theoretically.
Ultimately, central bank transparency is about
the broad communication of general preferences
by the central bank. When the public trusts in the
preferences of the central bank, its inflation expec-
tations will respond differently to shocks than when
trust is less (King, 1997; Kuttner and Posen, 1999).
In this regard, it is important to have a forecast defi-
nition that is not just the revelation of numbers, but
a mechanism for a structured conversation with the
public that conveys the central bank’s evaluation
of shocks and reinforces the longer-term goals. Posen
(2000) sets out this framework and identifies it as
the source of the Bundesbank’s success. This would
imply that the independent variable to measure is
the institutional framework committing the central
bank to regularly report on its activities and explain
its performance against its stated goals (Kuttner and
Posen, 2001, give one way of operationalizing such
a measure for empirical work).
Interestingly, this is consistent with the fact noted
in the previous section that the bulk of variation
and explanatory power in the authors’ measure has
to do with whether or not (in their survey) central
banks discuss risks to the forecast. Thus, it is not
the forecast specifically or the implication of reason-
ing backwards to a model (to “discern control errors”
as the authors have it) that counts. It is the provision
of context for economic decisionmakers. This under-
lines the difficulties the authors have in “controlling”
for the broader institutional structures of inflation
targeting, central bank independence, and exchange
rate pegs in their investigations. 
Given that the authors have only a cross-section
of central bank self-definitions, because of their
commitment to use survey data from a specific one-
time survey, they cannot distinguish whether the
disclosure of forecasts is the result of a prior or
contemporaneous adoption of inflation targeting
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6 Another problem with this examination of endogeneity is that all
countries’ desirable real growth level is presumed to be 2 percent,
and the desirable inflation level is presumed to be 2.5 percent, which
is rather inappropriate for a sample that includes numerous developing
and transitional economies.or of something called (but not necessarily indicative
of) central bank independence. Their use of the IMF’s
definition of exchange rate pegs is particularly mis-
leading in this set-up: it is impossible to tell whether
inflation forecasts do not offer “transparency
benefits” when pegs are in place (i) because of a
lack of discretion or (ii) because inflation is irrelevant
to the goal of the central bank (especially because, as
is now well-known, many floaters seem like fixers).
Ultimately, the authors’ use of their idiosyncratic
measure of forecast disclosure as a measure of
transparency, and their reliance on the one-time
observation of it, renders their definition of the
explanatory variable irrelevant.
WHAT EXPECTED IMPACT OF 
TRANSPARENCY IS REASONABLE 
TO TEST?
Whatever the measure of transparency, the
authors have another hurdle in deciding which
variables should be affected by it. As mentioned,
they test two—average inflation level and average
output volatility—finding support for a negative
correlation between transparency and the first
and no correlation with the second. But are these
the right variables to test? It is not clear that average
macroeconomic outcomes, particularly of real vari-
ables, are the right dependent variables for investi-
gations of transparency. The obvious problem,
particularly on the real side, is the inability to control
for a sufficient range of factors, including the degree
of structural change induced (or not) by changes in
monetary regime, a la Lucas.
More importantly, though, is the question of
what one thinks central bank transparency is for.
Even if the central bank has a greater commitment
to low inflation, or can be held to one because of
increased transparency (which seems to be the
authors’ vision), dependent upon the shocks that
the bank faces, it can choose to let inflation rise
temporarily. For example, after the second oil shock
in 1979, the Bundesbank allowed its “unavoidable
rate of price increase” to climb from 2 percent to
over 4 percent in 1980 and then transparently
brought it down year-by-year to 1986 (see Laubach
and Posen, 1998). This may well have been the
optimal response to a supply shock for a (nearly)
inflation-targeting central bank (see Bernanke et al.,
1999, Chap. 4). What made the Bundesbank’s policy
a success was that this optimal easing did not result
in pass-through of a second round of inflation
increases, or even a particularly costly disinflation. 
Kuttner and Posen (1999, 2001a,b) argue that this
means the real issue of central bank transparency
is therefore the reaction of inflation expectations
and (long-bond) markets conditional on central bank
action. The implication is that the macroeconomic
variables likely to be affected most directly by trans-
parency are inflation persistence, not inflation level,
and the ratio of inflation and output volatility, not
the level of output volatility. Following King’s (1997)
articulation of the optimal state-contingent rule
strategy for an inflation-targeting central bank,
increased transparency should remove Svensson’s
(1997) stabilization bias, reducing inflation persis-
tence, and should free the central bank to be more
aggressive about stabilizing output. From this point
of view, the authors’ focus on inflation level as the
dependent variable is misguided, even if one accepts
that the point of transparency is to make the central
bank more sensitive about its reputation.
THE CELL PHONE–LIKE USES OF 
CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY7
What are the hypotheses that might be tested
about central bank transparency, and what are the
appropriate measures that might be utilized instead
of the ones in the authors’ paper? Think of the rela-
tionship between a central bank and the attentive
public as analogous to the relationship between a
married couple. Good communication is key if the
relationship is to cope well with the bumps and
bruises of everyday life. While familiarity removes
the need for too much explicitness in communica-
tion, changing surroundings and personal needs
over time make it dangerous to take too much pre-
vious understanding for granted. Presumably, the
relationship is for the long-term and day-to-day mis-
understandings do not imperil the relationship, but
they can make it less pleasant or mutually beneficial.
My wife already has a (subjective) estimate of
how considerate a husband I am, that is, my “type”
on a scale of wet to dry. While she may update it if
I were to do something extraordinarily bad or good
more than once, she is unlikely to do so as a result
of our quotidian existence. In fact, small variations
in the day-to-day signals she gets from me are likely
to be ignored, while any big changes will be easily
noticed, whatever the day-to-day signals. Communi-
cation between us, therefore, is not about her judging
my type or my commitment—instead, it is about
the smaller, practical issues of coordination.
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7 This section is drawn and adapted from Posen (2002).This fall, in response to the more worrisome
world in which we find ourselves, my wife had me
get a cell phone. This cell phone increases the trans-
parency with which I live my life: I can be reached
at any time we are apart, and similarly I can reach
her; in an emergency (God forbid), I can make a
call; and, most concretely, we can use it to update
each other on our schedules, such as who is likely
to get home first from work. I can be more or less
considerate about updating her by using the cell
phone (probably well within one standard deviation
of how considerate I was prior to having this trans-
parency mechanism). Yet, her primary concern is
to know where I am for practical reasons and not
to have a means of monitoring my commitment to
her well-being.
Being a bit more explicit, there are six conceiv-
able channels through which my use of the cell
phone could affect her:
• She could be more relaxed in general if
updates via cell phone about my comings
and goings reduce her worry.
• She could find life a little easier if this device
makes it simpler for us to adjust our schedules.
• She could find that, after all, she really does
not care about what I say on the cell phone,
just that I am no less prompt or responsive
than I was before.
• She could herself become more cognizant of
my activities and use this to demand greater
responsiveness, perhaps interfering with my
normal habits.
• She could become annoyed if I were to say
that I would call at a specified time and am
late in doing so.
• Or, she could be more (rather than less) wor-
ried if she came to count on my calls and
events beyond my control, even innocuous
ones, prevented me from calling.
It is ultimately an empirical matter which of
these various, occasionally contradictory, but all
theoretically plausible, effects will turn out to be of
practical import to the day-to-day functioning of our
relationship. To repeat, none of this, however, should
change her basic estimate of what type of husband
I am and therefore of my level of commitment.
Now, consider the analogous situation of a
central bank communicating with its public (includ-
ing financial markets) as part of an ongoing relation-
ship based on a fundamental assumption of trust
and good will. The addition of various recent mea-
sures of transparency to monetary policymaking—
announced inflation targets, disclosure of votes,
timely publication of minutes, explicit forecasts, and
so on—in hopes of showing sensitivity to markets
and the public’s concerns are the equivalent of my
acquisition and use of the cell phone in response to
my wife’s concerns. Being a bit more explicit, there
are six conceivable channels through which central
banks’ enhanced transparency could influence the
public’s and markets’ reaction to monetary policy
(see Table 1):
• The public could be reassured in general if
updates via regular releases about policy
decisions reduce worry about what is going
on in the short-term.
• The public, and particularly markets, could
find it a little easier to plan their actions if
transparency about the details of the economy
makes the world more predictable.
• The public could find that, after all, what
central banks say is irrelevant, so long as the
central banks are no less responsive to shocks
than before.
• The public, and particularly markets, could
become more cognizant of central bank
activities and use this to demand greater
responsiveness contingent on specific targets,
perhaps interfering with central banks’ nor-
mal habits.
• The public could become annoyed, adding
political pressures, if central banks were to
announce a specific target or forecast, and
fail to meet it.
• Or, the public could be more (rather than less)
worried in general if it demanded adherence
to announced targets, diverting central banks
from responding optimally to shocks.
As Table 1 summarizes, each of these six practi-
cal views of central bank transparency (reassuring,
detailed, irrelevant, contingent, annoying, and
diverting) focuses on a specific set of information
releases, with a specific hypothesis for the impact
of those releases upon expectations and central
bank behavior and for the mechanism by which
this impact is transmitted. None of these hypotheses
can be ruled out a priori on theoretical grounds,
and these multiple options show the diversity of
implications possible from (and proposed in) the
current literature on central bank transparency. All
are subject to empirical examination, and some
work has already been completed. On the reassuring
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and Posen (1999, 2001a,b) have offered evidence
that the announcement of explicit inflation targets
is associated with a decline in inflation persistence
and no rise in output volatility; this tends to contra-
dict the diverting view, which is the mirror image
with opposite predictions. On the details view,
Daniel Thornton has done a series of papers (includ-
ing Poole, Rasche, Thornton, 2002, for this confer-
ence) indicating the benefits of disclosure for the U.S.
Treasuries market.8 The authors of “Does It Pay To
Be Transparent?” can find in these papers some
evidence that their answer of yes is correct, even
though the authors’ own method of assessing the
contingent view is unconvincing.
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